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Abstract
Heap layout manipulation is integral to exploiting heap-
based memory corruption vulnerabilities. In this pa-
per we present the first automatic approach to the prob-
lem, based on pseudo-random black-box search. Our
approach searches for the inputs required to place the
source of a heap-based buffer overflow or underflow next
to heap-allocated objects that an exploit developer, or
automatic exploit generation system, wishes to read or
corrupt. We present a framework for benchmarking heap
layout manipulation algorithms, and use it to evaluate
our approach on several real-world allocators, showing
that pseudo-random black box search can be highly effec-
tive. We then present SHRIKE, a novel system that can
perform automatic heap layout manipulation on the PHP
interpreter and can be used in the construction of control-
flow hijacking exploits. Starting from PHP’s regression
tests, SHRIKE discovers fragments of PHP code that in-
teract with the interpreter’s heap in useful ways, such as
making allocations and deallocations of particular sizes,
or allocating objects containing sensitive data, such as
pointers. SHRIKE then uses our search algorithm to piece
together these fragments into programs, searching for one
that achieves a desired heap layout. SHRIKE allows an
exploit developer to focus on the higher level concepts
in an exploit, and to defer the resolution of heap layout
constraints to SHRIKE. We demonstrate this by using
SHRIKE in the construction of a control-flow hijacking
exploit for the PHP interpreter.
1 Introduction
Over the past decade several researchers [5, 8, 9, 16] have
addressed the problem of automatic exploit generation
(AEG) for stack-based buffer overflows. These papers
describe algorithms for automatically producing a control-
flow hijacking exploit, under the assumption that an input
is provided, or discovered, that results in the corruption of
an instruction pointer stored on the stack. However, stack-
based buffer overflows are just one type of vulnerability
found in software written in C and C++. Out-of-bounds
(OOB) memory access from heap buffers is a common
flaw and, up to now, has received little attention in terms
of automation. Heap-based memory corruption differs
significantly from stack-based memory corruption. In the
latter case the data that the attacker may corrupt is limited
to whatever is on the stack and can be varied by chang-
ing the execution path used to trigger the vulnerability.
For heap-based corruption, it is the physical layout of
dynamically allocated buffers in memory that determines
what gets corrupt:ed. The attacker must reason about the
heap layout to automatically construct an exploit. In [26],
exploits for heap-based vulnerabilities are considered, but
the foundational problem of producing inputs that guaran-
tee a particular heap layout is not addressed.
To leverage OOB memory access as part of an exploit,
an attacker will usually want to position some dynam-
ically allocated buffer D, the OOB access destination,
relative to some other dynamically allocated buffer S, the
OOB access source.1 The desired positioning will depend
on whether the flaw to be leveraged is an overflow or an
underflow, and on the control the attacker has over the
offset from S that will be accessed. Normally, the attacker
wants to position S and D so that, when the vulnerability
is triggered, D is corrupted while minimising collateral
damage to other heap allocated structures.
Allocators do not expose an API to allow a user to
control relative positioning of allocated memory regions.
In fact, the ANSI C specification [2] explicitly states
The order and contiguity of storage allocated
by successive calls to the calloc, malloc, and
realloc functions is unspecified.
Furthermore, applications that use dynamic memory al-
location do not expose an API allowing an attacker to
1Henceforth, when we refer to the ‘source’ and ‘destination’ we
mean the source or destination buffer of the overflow or underflow.
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1 typedef struct {
2 DisplayFn display;
3 char *n;
4 unsigned *id
5 } User;
6
7 User* create(char *name) {
8 if (!strlen(name) || strlen(name) >= 8)
9 return 0;
10 User *user = malloc(sizeof(User));
11 user->display = &printf;
12 user->n = malloc(strlen(name) + 1);
13 strlcpy(user->n, name, 8);
14 user->id = malloc(sizeof(unsigned));
15 get_uuid(user->id);
16 return user;
17 }
18
19 void destroy(User *user) {
20 free(user->id);
21 free(user->n);
22 free(user);
23 }
24
25 void rename(User *user, char *new) {
26 strlcpy(user->n, new, 12);
27 }
28
29 void display(User *user) {
30 user->display(user->n);
31 }
Listing 1: Example API offered by a target program.
directly interact with the allocator in an arbitrary man-
ner. An exploit developer must first discover the allocator
interactions that can be indirectly triggered via the appli-
cation’s API, and then leverage these to solve the layout
problem. In practice, both problems are usually solved
manually; this requires expert knowledge of the internals
of both the heap allocator and the application’s use of it.
1.1 An Example
Consider the code in Listing 1 showing the API for a
target program. The rename function contains a heap-
based overflow if the new name is longer than the old
name. One way for an attacker to exploit the flaw in the
rename function is to try to position a buffer allocated
to hold the name for a User immediately before a User
structure. The User structure contains a function pointer
as its first field and an attacker in control of this field can
redirect the control flow of the target to a destination of
their choice by then calling the display function.
As the attacker cannot directly interact with the alloca-
tor, the desired heap layout must be achieved indirectly
Figure 1: An series of interactions which result in a name
buffer immediately prior to a User structure.
utilising those functions in the target’s API which per-
form allocations and deallocations. While the create
and destroy functions do allow the attacker to make al-
locations and deallocations of a controllable size, other
allocator interactions that are unavoidable also take place,
namely the allocation and deallocation of the buffers for
the User and id. We refer to these unwanted interactions
as noise, and such interactions, especially allocations, can
increase the difficulty of the problem by placing buffers
between the source and destination.
Figure 1 shows one possible sequence in which the
create and destroy functions are used to craft the de-
sired heap layout.2 The series of interactions performed
by the attacker are as follows:
1. Four users are created with names of length 7, 3, 1,
and 3 letters, respectively.
2. The first and the third user are destroyed, creating
two holes: One of size 24 and one of size 18.
3. A user with a name of length 7 is created. The allo-
cator uses the hole of size 18 to satisfy the allocation
request for the 12-byte User structure, leaving 6 free
bytes. The request for the 8-byte name buffer is
satisfied using the 24-byte hole, leaving a hole of
16 bytes. An allocation of 4 bytes for the id then
reduces the 6 byte hole to 2.
4. A user with a name of length 3 is created. The
16-byte hole is used for the User object, leaving
4 bytes into which the name buffer is then placed.
This results in the name buffer, highlighted in green,
being directly adjacent to a User structure.
Once this layout has been achieved an overflow can
be triggered using the rename function, corrupting the
display field of the User object. The control flow of the
2Assume a best-fit allocator using last-in-first-out free lists to store
free chunks, no limit on free chunk size, no size rounding and no inline
allocator metadata. Furthermore, assume that pointers are 4 bytes in
size and that a User structure is 12 bytes in size.
application can then be hijacked by calling the display
function with the corrupted User object as an argument.
1.2 Contributions
Our contributions are as follows:
1. An analysis of the heap layout manipulation (HLM)
problem as a standalone task within the context of
automatic exploit generation, outlining its essential
aspects and describing the factors which influence
its complexity.
2. SIEVE, an open source framework for constructing
benchmarks for heap layout manipulation and evalu-
ating algorithms.
3. A pseudo-random black box search algorithm for
heap layout manipulation. Using SIEVE, we evalu-
ate the effectiveness of this algorithm on three real-
world allocators, namely dlmalloc, avrlibc and
tcmalloc.
4. An architecture, and proof-of-concept implementa-
tion, for a system that integrates automatic HLM into
the exploit development process. The implementa-
tion, SHRIKE, automatically solves heap layout con-
straints that arise when constructing exploits for the
PHP interpreter. SHRIKE also demonstrates a novel
approach to integrating an automated reasoning en-
gine into the exploit development process. The ex-
ploit developer produces a partial exploit with mark-
ers indicating heap layout problems to be solved.
SHRIKE takes this partial exploit as input and com-
pletes it by solving these problems.
The source code for SHRIKE and SIEVE can be found
at https://sean.heelan.io/heaplayout.
2 The Heap Layout Manipulation Problem
in Deterministic Settings
As of 2018, the most common approach to solving heap
layout manipulation problems is manual work by experts.
An analyst examines the allocator’s implementation to
gain an understanding of its internals; then, at run-time,
they inspect the state of its various data structures to
determine what interactions are necessary in order to ma-
nipulate the heap into the required layout.
Heap layout manipulation primarily consists of two
activities: creating and filling holes in memory. A hole
is a free area of memory that the allocator may use to
service future allocation requests. Holes are filled to force
the positioning of an allocation of a particular size else-
where, or the creation of a fresh area of memory under
the management of the allocator. Holes are created to
capture allocations that would otherwise interfere with
the layout one is trying to achieve. This process is doc-
umented in the literature of the hacking and computer
Figure 2: The challenges in achieving a particular layout
vary depending on whether the allocator behaves deter-
ministically or non-deterministically and whether or not
the starting state of the heap is known.
security communities, with a variety of papers on the in-
ternals of individual allocators [1,4,20,22], as well as the
manipulation and exploitation of those allocators when
embedded in applications [3, 19, 27].
The process is complicated by the fact that – when
constructing an exploit – one cannot directly interact with
the allocator, but instead must use the API exposed by
the target program. Manipulating the heap state via the
program’s API is often referred to as heap feng shui in
the computer security literature [28]. Discovering the re-
lationship between program-level API calls and allocator
interactions is a prerequisite for real-world HLM but can
be addressed separately, as we demonstrate in section 4.2.
2.1 Problem Restrictions for a
Deterministic Setting
There are four variants of the HLM problem, as shown
in Figure 2, depending on whether the allocator is
deterministic or non-deterministic and whether the start-
ing state is known or unknown. A deterministic allocator
is one that does not utilise any random behaviour when
servicing allocation requests. The majority of allocators
are deterministic, but some, such as the Windows sys-
tem allocator, jemalloc and the DIEHARD family of
allocators [6, 24], do utilise non-determinism to make ex-
ploitation more difficult. The starting state of the heap at
which the attacker can begin interacting with the allocator
is given the allocations and frees that have taken place
up to that point. For the starting state to be known, this
sequence of interactions must be known.
In this paper we consider a known starting state and a
deterministic allocator, and assume there are no other ac-
tors interacting with the heap. While restricted, this both
corresponds to a set of real world exploitation scenarios
and provides a building block for addressing the other
three problem variants.
Local privilege escalation exploits are a scenario in
which these restrictions are usually met, as the attacker
can often tell what allocations and deallocations take place
prior to their interactions. For remote and client-side
targets, the starting state is usually not known. However,
for some such targets it is possible to force the creation
of a new heap in a predictable state.
When unknown starting states and non-determinism
must be dealt with, approaches such as allocating a large
number of objects on the heap in the hope of corrupting
one when the vulnerability is triggered are often used.
However, in the problem variant we address it is usually
possible to position the overflow source relative to a spe-
cific target buffer. Thus our objective in this variant of the
HLM problem is as follows:
Given the API for a target program and a means
by which to allocate a source and destination
buffer, find a sequence of API calls that position
the destination and source at a specific offset
from each other.
2.2 Challenges
There are several challenges that arise when trying to
perform HLM and when trying to construct a general,
automated solution. In this section we outline those that
are most likely to be significant.
2.2.1 Interaction Noise
Before continuing we first must informally define the con-
cept of an ‘interaction sequence’: an allocator interaction
is a call to one of its allocation or deallocation functions,
while an interaction sequence is a list of one or more
interactions that result from the invocation of a function
in the target program’s API. As an attacker cannot directly
invoke functions in the allocator they must manipulate
the heap via the available interaction sequences. As an
example, when the create function from Listing 1 is
called the resulting interaction sequence consists of three
interactions in the form of the three calls to malloc. The
destroy function also provides an interaction sequence
of length three, in this case consisting of three calls to
free.
For a given interaction sequence there can be interac-
tions that are beneficial, and assist with manipulation of
the heap into a layout that is desirable, and also interac-
tions that are either not beneficial (but benign), or in fact
are detrimental to the heap state in terms of the layout one
is attempting to achieve. We deem those interactions that
are not actively manipulating the heap into a desirable
state to be noise.
For example, the create function from Listing 1 pro-
vides the ability to allocate buffers between 2 and 8 bytes
in size by varying the length of the name parameter. How-
ever, two other unavoidable allocations also take place –
one for the User structure and one for the id. As shown
in Figure 1, some effort must be invested in crafting the
heap layout to ensure that the noisy id allocation is placed
out of the way and a name and User structure end up next
to each other.
2.2.2 Constraints on Allocator Interactions
An attacker’s access to the allocator is limited by what is
allowed by the program they are interacting with. The in-
terface available may limit the sizes that may be allocated,
the order in which they may be allocated and deallocated,
and the number of times a particular size may be allo-
cated or deallocated. Depending on the heap layout that
is desired, these constraints may make the desired layout
more complex to achieve, or even impossible.
2.2.3 Diversity of Allocator Implementations
The open ended nature of allocator design and implemen-
tation means any approach that involves the production
of a formal model of a particular allocator is going to be
costly and likely limited to a single allocator, and perhaps
even a specific version of that allocator. While avrlibc
is a mere 350 lines of code, most of the other allocators
we consider contain thousands or tens of thousands of
lines of code. Their implementations involve complex
data structures, loops without fixed bounds, interaction
with the operating system and other features that are of-
ten terminally challenging for semantics-aware analyses,
such as model checking and symbolic execution. A de-
tailed survey of the data structures and algorithms used in
allocators is available in [34].
2.2.4 Interaction Sequence Discovery
Since in most situations one cannot directly interact with
the allocator, an attacker needs to discover what interac-
tion sequences with the allocator can be indirectly trig-
gered via the program’s API. This problem can be ad-
dressed separately to the main HLM problem, but it is
a necessary first step. In section 4.2 we discuss how we
solved this problem for the PHP language interpreter.
3 Automatic Heap Layout Manipulation
We now present our pseudo-random black box search
algorithm for HLM, and two evaluation frameworks we
have embedded it in to solve heap layout problems on
both synthetic benchmarks and real vulnerabilities. The
algorithm is theoretically and practically straightforward.
There are two strong motivations for initially avoiding
complexity.
Firstly, there is no existing prior work on automatic
HLM and a straightforward algorithm provides a baseline
that future, more sophisticated, implementations can be
compared against if necessary.
Secondly, despite the potential size of the problem
measured by the number of possible combinations of
available interactions, there is significant symmetry in the
solution space for many problem instances. Since our
measure of success is based on the relative positioning of
two buffers, large equivalence classes of solutions exist
as:
1. Neither the absolute location of the two buffers, nor
their relative position to other buffers, matters.
2. The order in which holes are created or filled usually
does not matter.
It is often possible to solve a layout problem using
significantly differing input sequences. Due to these solu-
tion space symmetries, we propose that a pseudo-random
black box search could be a solution for a sufficiently
large number of problem instances as to be worthwhile.
To test this hypothesis, and demonstrate its feasibility
on real targets, we constructed two systems. The first,
described in section 3.1 allows for synthetic benchmarks
to be constructed with any allocator exposing the standard
ANSI interface for dynamic memory allocation. The sec-
ond system, described in section 3.2, is a fully automated
HLM system designed to work with the PHP interpreter.
3.1 SIEVE: An Evaluation Framework for
HLM Algorithms
To allow for the evaluation of search algorithms for HLM
across a diverse array of benchmarks we constructed
SIEVE. It allows for flexible and scalable evaluation of
new search algorithms, or testing existing algorithms on
new allocators, new interaction sequences or new heap
starting states. There are two components to SIEVE:
1. The SIEVE driver which is a program that can
be linked with any allocator exposing the malloc,
free, calloc and realloc functions. As input it
takes a file specifying a series of allocation and deal-
location requests to make, and produces as output
the distance between two particular allocations of
interest. Allocations and deallocations are specified
via directives of the following forms:
(a) <malloc size ID>
(b) <calloc nmemb size ID>
(c) <free ID>
(d) <realloc oldID size ID>
(e) <fst size>
(f) <snd size>
Each of the first four directives are translated into
an invocation of their corresponding memory man-
agement function, with the ID parameters providing
an identifier which can be used to refer to the re-
turned pointers from malloc, calloc and realloc,
when they are passed to free or realloc. The fi-
nal two directives indicate the allocation of the two
buffers that we are attempting to place relative to
each other. We refer to the addresses that result
from the corresponding allocations as addrFst and
Algorithm 1 Find a solution that places two allocations
in memory at a specified distance from each other. The
integer g is the number of candidates to try, d the required
distance, m the maximum candidate size and r the ratio
of allocations to deallocations for each candidate.
1: function SEARCH(g,d,m,r)
2: for i← 0,g−1 do
3: cand← ConstructCandidate(m,r)
4: dist← Execute(cand)
5: if dist = d then
6: return cand
7: return None
8: function CONSTRUCTCANDIDATE(m,r)
9: cand← InitCandidate(GetStartingState())
10: len← Random(1,m)
11: fstIdx← Random(0, len−1)
12: for i← 0, len−1 do
13: if i = fstIdx then
14: AppendFstSequence(cand)
15: else if Random(1,100)≤ r then
16: AppendAllocSequence(cand)
17: else
18: AppendFreeSequence(cand)
19: AppendSndSequence(cand)
20: return cand
addrSnd, respectively. After the allocation direc-
tives for these buffers have been processed, the value
of (addrFst−addrSnd) is produced.
2. The SIEVE framework which provides a Python API
for running HLM experiments. It has a variety of fea-
tures for constructing candidate solutions, feeding
them to the driver and retrieving the resulting dis-
tance, which are explained below. This functionality
allows one to focus on creating search algorithms for
HLM.
We implemented a pseudo-random search algorithm
for HLM on top of SIEVE, and it is shown as Algorithm 1.
The m and r parameters are what make the search pseudo-
random. While one could potentially use a completely
random search, it makes sense to guide it away from
candidates that are highly unlikely to be useful due to
extreme values for m and r. There are a few points to note
on the SIEVE framework’s API in order to understand the
algorithm:
• The directives to be passed to the driver are
represented in the framework via a Candidate
class. The InitCandidate function creates a new
Candidate.
• Often one may want to experiment with performing
HLM after a number of allocator interactions, repre-
senting initialisation of the target application before
the attacker can interact, have taken place. SIEVE
can be configured with a set of such interactions
that can be retrieved via the GetStartingState
function. InitCandidate can be provided with the
result of GetStartingState (line 9).
• The available interaction sequences impact the
difficulty of HLM, i.e. if an attacker can trig-
ger individual allocations of arbitrary sizes they
will have more precise control of the heap lay-
out than if they can only make allocations of
a single size. To experiment with changes in
the available interaction sequences, the user of
SIEVE overrides the AppendAllocSequence and
AppendFreeSequence3 functions to select one of
the available interaction sequences and append it to
the candidate (lines 16-18).
• The directive to allocate the first buffer of interest
is placed at a random offset within the candidate
(line 14), with the directive to allocate the second
buffer of interest placed at the end (line 19). To
experiment with the addition of noise in the alloca-
tion of these buffers, the AppendFstSequence and
AppendSndSequence functions can be overloaded.
• The Execute function takes a candidate, serialises
it into the form required by the SIEVE driver, exe-
cutes the driver on the resulting file and returns the
distance output by the driver (line 4).
• As the value output by the driver is (addrFst −
addrSnd), to search for a solution placing the buffer
allocated first before the buffer allocated second, a
negative value can be provided for the d parameter
to Search. Providing a positive value will search
for a solution placing the buffers in the opposite or-
der. In this manner overflows and underflows can be
simulated, with either temporal order of allocation
for the source and destination (line 5).
The experimental setup used to evaluate pseudo-
random search as a means for solving HLM problems
on synthetic benchmarks is described in section 4.1.
3.2 SHRIKE: A HLM System for PHP
For real-world usage the search algorithm must be embed-
ded in a system that solves a variety of other problems
in order to allow the search to take place. To evaluate
the feasibility of end-to-end automation of HLM we con-
structed SHRIKE, a HLM system for the PHP interpreter.
We choose PHP as it has a number of attributes that make
it ideal for experimentation. PHP combines a large, mod-
ern application containing complex functionality, with a
language that is relatively stable and easy to work with
in an automated fashion. On top of that, it has an open
3AppendFreeSequence function will detect if there are no allo-
cated buffers to free and redirect to AppendAllocSequence instead.
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Figure 3: Architecture diagram for SHRIKE
version control system and bug tracker.
Furthermore, PHP is an interesting target from a se-
curity point of view as the ability to exploit heap-based
vulnerabilities locally in PHP allows attackers to increase
their capabilities in situations where the PHP environment
has been hardened [12].
The architecture of SHRIKE is shown in Figure 3. We
implemented the system as three distinct phases:
• A component that identifies fragments of PHP code
that provide distinct allocator interaction sequences
(Section 3.2.1).
• A component that identifies dynamically allocated
structures that may be useful to corrupt or read as
part of an exploit, and a means to trigger their allo-
cation (Section 3.2.2).
• A search procedure that pieces together the frag-
ments triggering allocator interactions to produce
PHP programs as candidates (Section 3.2.4). The
user specifies how to allocate the source and destina-
tion, as well as how to trigger the vulnerability, via a
template (Section 3.2.3).
The first two components can be run once and the re-
sults stored for use during the search. If successful, the
output of the search is a new PHP program that manipu-
lates the heap to ensure that when the specified vulnera-
bility is triggered the source and destination buffers are
adjacent.
To support the functionality required by SHRIKE we
implemented an extension for PHP. This extension pro-
vides functions that can be invoked from a PHP script to
enable a variety of features including recording the allo-
cations that result from invoking a fragment of PHP code,
monitoring allocations for the presence of interesting data,
and checking the distance between two allocations. We
carefully implemented the functionality of this extension
to ensure that it does not modify the heap layout of the
target program in any way that would invalidate search
results. However, all results are validated by executing
the solutions in an unmodified version of PHP.
3.2.1 Identifying Available Interaction Sequences
To discover the available interaction sequences it is neces-
sary to construct self-contained fragments of PHP code
and determine the allocator interactions each fragment
triggers. Correlating code fragments with the resulting
allocator interactions is straightforward: we instrument
the PHP interpreter to record the allocator interactions
that result from executing a given fragment. Constructing
valid fragments of PHP code that trigger a diverse set of
allocator interactions is more involved.
We resolve the latter problem by implementing a fuzzer
for the PHP interpreter that leverages the regression tests
that come with PHP, in the form of PHP programs. This
idea is based on previous work that used a similar ap-
proach for the purposes of vulnerability detection [17,18].
The tests provide examples of the functions that can be
called, as well as the number and types of their arguments.
The fuzzer then mutates existing fragments, to produce
new fragments with new behaviours.
To tune the fuzzer towards the discovery of fragments
that are useful for HLM, as opposed to vulnerability dis-
covery, we made the following modifications:
• We use mutations that are intended to produce an
interaction sequence that we have not seen before,
rather than a crash. For example, fuzzers will often
replace integers with values that may lead to edge
cases, such as 0, 232−1, 231−1 and so on. We are
interested in triggering unique allocator interactions
however, and so we predominantly mutate tests using
integers and string lengths that relate to allocation
sizes we have not previously seen.
• Our measure of fitness for a generated test is not
based on code coverage, as is often the case with vul-
nerability detection, but is instead based on whether
a new allocator interaction sequence is produced,
and the length of that interaction sequence.
• We discard any fragments that result in the inter-
preter exiting with an error.
• We favour the shortest, least complex fragments with
priority being given to fragments consisting of a
single function call.
As an example, lets discuss how the regression test in
Listing 2 would be used to discover interaction sequences.
From the regression test the fuzzing specification
shown in Listing 3 is automatically produced. Fuzzing
specifications indicate the name of functions that can
be called, along with the types of their arguments.
SHRIKE then begins to fuzz the discovered functions,
using the specifications to ensure the correct types
are provided for each argument. For example, the
1 $image = imagecreatetruecolor(180, 30);
2 imagestring($image, 5, 10, 8, "Text",
0x00ff00);
3 $gaussian = array(
4 array(1.0, 2.0, 1.0),
5 array(2.0, 4.0, 2.0)
6 );
7 var_dump(imageconvolution($image,
$gaussian, 16, 0));
Listing 2: Source for a PHP test program.
1 imagecreatetruecolor(I, I)
2 imagestring(R, I, I, I, T, I)
3 array(F, F, F)
4 array(R, R)
5 var_dump(R)
6 imageconvolution(R, R, I, I)
Listing 3: The function fuzzing specifications produced
from parsing Listing 2. The letters replacing the function
arguments indicate their types. ‘R’ for a resource, ‘I’ for
an integer, ‘F’ for a float and ‘T’ for text.
code fragments $x = imagecreatetruecolor(1,
1), $x = imagecreatetruecolor(1, 2), $x =
imagecreatetruecolor(1, 3) etc. might be created
and executed to determine what, if any, allocator
interactions they trigger.
The output of this stage is a mapping from fragments
of PHP code to a summary of the allocator interaction se-
quences that occur as a result of executing that code. The
summary includes the number and size of any allocations,
and whether the sequence triggers any frees.
3.2.2 Automatic Identification of Target Structures
In most programs there is a diverse set of dynamically al-
located structures that one could corrupt or read to violate
some security property of the program. These targets may
be program-specific, such as values that guard a sensitive
path; or they may be somewhat generic, such as a function
pointer. Identifying these targets, and how to dynamically
allocate them, can be a difficult manual task in itself. To
further automate the process we implemented a compo-
nent that, as with the fuzzer, splits the PHP tests into
standalone fragments and then observes the behaviour of
these fragments when executed. If the fragment dynam-
ically allocates a buffer and writes what appears to be
a pointer to that buffer, we consider the buffer to be an
interesting corruption target and store the fragment. The
user can indicate in the template which of the discovered
corruption targets to use, or the system can automatically
select one.
1 <?php
2 $quote_str = str_repeat("\xf4", 123);
3 #X-SHRIKE HEAP-MANIP
4 #X-SHRIKE RECORD-ALLOC 0 1
5 $image = imagecreate(1, 2);
6 #X-SHRIKE HEAP-MANIP
7 #X-SHRIKE RECORD-ALLOC 0 2
8 quoted_printable_encode($quote_str);
9 #X-SHRIKE REQUIRE-DISTANCE 1 2 0
10 ?>
Listing 4: Exploit template for CVE-2013-2110
3.2.3 Specifying Candidate Structure
Different vulnerabilities require different setup in order
to trigger e.g. the initialisation of required objects or the
invocation of multiple functions. To avoid hard-coding
vulnerability-specific information in the candidate cre-
ation process, we allow for the creation of candidate tem-
plates that define the structure of a candidate. A template
is a normal PHP program with the addition of directives
starting with #X-SHRIKE4. The template is processed
by SHRIKE and the directives inform it how candidates
should be produced and what constraints they must satisfy
to solve the HLM problem. The supported directives are:
• <HEAP-MANIP [sizes]> Indicates a location
where SHRIKE can insert heap-manipulating se-
quences. The sizes argument is an optional list
of integers indicating the allocation sizes that the
search should be restricted to.
• <RECORD-ALLOC offset id> Indicates that
SHRIKE should inject code to record the address
of an allocation and associate it with the provided
id argument. The offset argument indicates
the allocation to record. Offset 0 is the very next
allocation, offset 1 the one after that, and so on.
• <REQUIRE-DISTANCE idx idy dist> Indicates
that SHRIKE should inject code to check the distance
between the pointers associated with the provided
IDs. Assuming x and y are the pointers associated
with idx and idy respectively, then if (x− y = dist)
SHRIKE will report the result to the user, indicating
this particular HLM problem has been solved. If
(x− y 6= dist) then the candidate will be discarded
and the search will continue.
A sample template for CVE-2013-2110, a heap-based
buffer overflow in PHP, is shown in Listing 4. In sec-
tion 4.3 we explain how this template was used in the
construction of a control-flow hijacking exploit for PHP.
4As the directives begin with a ‘#’ they will be interpreted by the
normal PHP interpreter as a comment and thus can be run in both our
modified interpreter and an unmodified one.
Algorithm 2 Solve the HLM problem described in the
provided template t. The integer g is the number of can-
didates to try, d the required distance, m the maximum
number of fragments that can be inserted in place of each
HEAP-MANIP directive, and r the ratio of allocations to
deallocation fragments used in place of each HEAP-MANIP
directive.
1: function SEARCH(t,g,m,r)
2: spec← ParseTemplate(t)
3: for i← 0,g−1 do
4: cand← Instantiate(spec,m,r)
5: if Execute(cand) then
6: return cand
7: return None
8: function INSTANTIATE(spec,m,r)
9: cand← NewPHPProgram()
10: while n← Iterate(spec) do
11: if IsHeapManip(n) then
12: code← GetHeapManipCode(n,m,r)
13: else if IsRecordAlloc(c) then
14: code← GetRecordAllocCode(n)
15: else if IsRequireDistance(n) then
16: code← GetRequireDistanceCode(n)
17: else
18: code← GetVerbatim(n)
19: AppendCode(cand,code)
20: return cand
3.2.4 Search
The search in SHRIKE is outlined in Algorithm 2. It
takes in a template, parses it and then constructs and
executes PHP programs until a solution is found or the
execution budget expires. Candidate creation is shown
in the Instantiate function. Its first argument is a
representation of the template as a series of objects. The
objects represent either SHRIKE directives or normal PHP
code and are processed as follows:
• The HEAP-MANIP directive is handled via the
GetHeapManipCode function (line 12). The
database, constructed as described in section 3.2.1,
is queried for a series of PHP fragments, where each
fragment allocates or frees one of the sizes speci-
fied in the sizes argument to the directive in the
template. If no sizes are provided then all available
fragments are considered. If multiple fragments ex-
ist for a given size then selection is biased towards
fragments with less noise. Between 1 and m frag-
ments are selected and returned. The r parameter
controls the ratio of fragments containing allocations
to those containing frees.
• The RECORD-ALLOC directive is handled via the
GetRecordAllocCode function (line 14). A PHP
fragment is returned consisting of a call to a function
in our extension for PHP that associates the specified
allocation with the specified ID.
• The REQUIRE-DISTANCE directive is handled via
the GetRequireDistanceCode function (line 16).
A PHP fragment is returned with two components.
Firstly, a call to a function in our PHP extension that
queries the distance between the pointers associated
with the given IDs. Secondly, a conditional statement
that prints a success indicator if the returned distance
equals the distance parameter.
• All code that is not a SHRIKE directive is included
in each candidate verbatim (line 18).
The Execute function (line 5) converts the candidate
into a valid PHP program and invokes the PHP interpreter
on the result. It checks for the success indicator printed
by the code inserted to handle the REQUIRE-DISTANCE
directive. If that is detected then the solution program
is reported. Listing 5 in the appendix shows a solution
produced from the template in Listing 4.
4 Experiments and Evaluation
The research questions we address are as follows:
• RQ1: What factors most significantly impact the
difficulty of the heap layout manipulation problem
in a deterministic setting?
• RQ2: Is pseudo-random search an effective approach
to heap-layout manipulation?
• RQ3: Can heap layout manipulation be automated
effectively for real-world programs?
We conducted two sets of experiments. Firstly, to in-
vestigate the fundamentals of the problem we utilised
the system discussed in section 3.1 to construct a set
of synthetic benchmarks involving differing combina-
tions of heap starting states, interaction sequences, source
and destination sizes, and allocators. We chose the
tcmalloc (v2.6.1), dlmalloc (v2.8.6) and avrlibc
(v2.0) allocators for experimentation. These allocators
have significantly different implementations and are used
in many real world applications.
An important difference between the allocators used
for evaluation is that tcmalloc (and PHP) make use of
segregated storage, while dlmalloc and avrlibc do
not. In short, for small allocation sizes (e.g. less than
a 4KB) segregated storage pre-segments runs of pages
into chunks of the same size and will then only place
allocations of that size within those pages. Thus, only
allocations of the same, or similar, sizes may be adjacent
to each other, except for the first and last allocations in
Table 1: Synthetic benchmark results after 500,000 can-
didate solutions generated, averaged across all starting se-
quences. The full results are in Table 4 in the appendix. All
experiments were run 9 times and the results presented are
an average.
Allocator Noise
%
Overall
Solved
%
Natural
Solved
%
Reversed
Solved
avrlibc-r2537 0 100 100 99
dlmalloc-2.8.6 0 99 100 98
tcmalloc-2.6.1 0 72 75 69
avrlibc-r2537 1 51 50 52
dlmalloc-2.8.6 1 46 60 31
tcmalloc-2.6.1 1 52 58 47
avrlibc-r2537 4 41 44 38
dlmalloc-2.8.6 4 33 49 17
tcmalloc-2.6.1 4 37 51 24
the run of pages which may be adjacent to the last or first
allocation from other size classes.
Secondly, to evaluate the viability of our search algo-
rithm on real world applications we ran SHRIKE on 30
different layout manipulation problems in PHP. All ex-
periments were carried out on a server with 80 Intel Xeon
E7-4870 2.40GHz cores and 1TB of RAM, utilising 40
concurrent analysis processes.
4.1 Synthetic Benchmarks
The goal of evaluation on synthetic benchmarks is to dis-
cover the factors influencing the difficulty of problem in-
stances and to highlight the capabilities and limitations of
our search algorithm in an environment that we precisely
control. The benchmarks were constructed as follows:
• In real world scenarios it is often the case that the
available interaction sequences are noisy. To in-
vestigate how varying noise impacts problem dif-
ficulty, we constructed benchmarks in which varying
amounts of noise are injected during the allocation
of the source and destination. In Table 1, a value of
N in the ‘Noise’ column means that before and after
the first allocation of interest, N allocations of size
equal to the second allocation of interest allocation
are made.
• We initialise the heap state prior to executing the
interactions from a candidate by prefixing each can-
didate with a set of interactions. Previous work [34]
has outlined the drawbacks that arise when using
randomly generated heap states to evaluate allocator
performance. To avoid these drawbacks we captured
Figure 4: For an allocator that splits chunks from the start
of free blocks, the natural order, shown on the left, of
allocating the source and then the destination produces
the desired layout, while the reversed order, shown on the
right, results in an incorrect layout.
the initialisation sequences of PHP5, Python and
Ruby to use in our benchmarks. A summary of the
relevant properties of these initialisation sequences
can be found in the appendices in table 2.
• As it is not feasible to evaluate layout manipulation
for all possible combinations of source and destina-
tion sizes, we selected 6 sizes, deemed to be both
likely to occur in real world problems and to exercise
different allocator behaviour. The sizes we selected
are 8, 64, 512, 4096, 16384 and 65536. For each pair
of sizes (x,y) there are four possible benchmarks to
be run: x allocated temporally first overflowing into
y, x allocated temporally first underflowing into y, y
allocated temporally first overflowing into x, and y
allocated temporally first underflowing into x. This
produces 72 benchmarks to run for each combina-
tion of allocator (3), noise (3) and starting state (4),
giving 2592 benchmarks in total.
• For each source and destination combination size,
we made available to the analyser an interaction se-
quence which triggers an allocation of the source
size, an interaction sequence which triggers an al-
location of the destination size, and interaction se-
quences for freeing each of the allocations.
The m and r parameters to Algorithm 1 were set to
1000 and .98 respectively6.The g parameter was set to
500,000. A larger value would provide more opportuni-
ties for the search algorithm to find solutions, but with
2592 total benchmarks to run, and 500,000 executions
taking in the range of 5-15 minutes depending on the
number of interactions in the starting state, this was the
maximum viable value given our computational resources.
The results of the benchmarks averaged across all starting
states can be found in Table 1, with the full results in the
appendices in Table 4.
5PHP makes use of both the system allocator and its own allocator.
We captured the initialisation sequences for both.
6To determine reasonable values for these parameters, we con-
structed a small, distinct set of benchmarks explicitly for this purpose
and separate to those used in our evaluation.
Figure 5: A solution for the reversed allocation order to
corruption direction relationship. A hole is created via a
placeholder which can then be used for the source.
To understand the ‘% Natural’ and ‘% Reversed’
columns in the results table we must define the concept
of the allocation order to corruption direction relation-
ship. We refer to the case of the allocation of the source
of an overflow temporally first, followed by its destina-
tion, or the allocation of the destination of an underflow
temporally first, followed by its source as the natural re-
lationship. This is because most allocators split space
from the start of free chunks and thus, for an overflow, if
the source and destination are both split from the same
chunk and the source is allocated first then it will naturally
end up before the destination. The reverse holds for an
underflow. We refer to the relationship as reversed in the
case of the allocation of the destination temporally first
followed by the source for an overflow, or the allocation
of the source temporally first followed by the destination
for an underflow. We expect this case to be harder to solve
for most allocators, as the solution is more complex than
for the natural relationship. A visualisation of this idea
can be seen in Figure 4 and a solution for the reversed
case is shown in Figure 5.
From the benchmarks a number of points emerge:
• When segregated storage is not in use, as with
dlmalloc and avrlibc, and when there is no noise,
98% to 100% of the benchmarks are solved.
• Segregated storage significantly increases problem
difficulty. With no noise, the overall success rate
drops to 72% for tcmalloc.
• With the addition of a single noisy allocation, the
overall success rate drops to close to 50% across all
allocators.
• The order of allocation for the source and destina-
tion matters. A layout conforming to the natural
allocation order to corruption direction relationship
was easier to find in all problem instances. With
four noisy allocations the success rate for problems
involving the natural allocation order ranges from
44% to 51%, but drops to between 17% and 38%
for the reversed order. It is also worth noting that
the difference in success rate between natural and
reversed problem instances is lower for avrlibc
than for dlmalloc and tcmalloc. This is because
in some situations avrlibc will split space from
free chunks from the end instead of from the start.
Thus, a reversed order problem can be turned into
a natural order problem by forcing the heap into
such a state, and this is often easier than solving the
reversed order problem.
• We ran each experiment 9 times, and if all 9 ∗
500,000 executions are taken together then 78% of
the benchmarks are solved at least once. In other
words, only 22% of the benchmarks were never
solved by our approach, which is quite encourag-
ing given the simplicity of the algorithm.
4.2 PHP-Based Benchmarks
To determine if automatic HLM is feasible in real world
scenarios we selected three heap overflow vulnerabilities
and ten dynamically allocated structures that were identi-
fied by SHRIKE as being potentially useful targets (namely
structures that have pointers as their first field). Pairing
each vulnerability with each target structure provides a
total of 30 benchmarks. For each, we ran an experiment
in which SHRIKE was used to search for an input which
would place the overflow source and destination structure
adjacent to each other.
A successful outcome means the system can discover
how to interact with the underlying allocator via PHP’s
API, identify how to allocate sensitive data structures on
the heap, and construct a PHP program which places a
selected data structure adjacent to the source of an OOB
memory access. This saves an exploit developer a signifi-
cant amount of effort, allowing them to focus on how to
leverage the resulting OOB memory access.
Our evaluation utilised the following vulnerabilities:
• CVE-2015-8865. An out-of-bounds write vulnera-
bility in libmagic that exists in PHP up to version
7.0.4.
• CVE-2016-5093. An out-of-bounds read vulnera-
bility in PHP up to version 7.0.7, related to string
processing and internationalisation.
• CVE-2016-7126. An out-of-bounds write vulnera-
bility in PHP up to version 7.0.10, related to image
processing.
The ten target structures are described in the appendix
in Table 3 and the full details of all 30 experiments can
be found in Table 5. As with the synthetic benchmarks,
the m and r arguments to the Search function were set to
1000 and .98 respectively. Instead of limiting the number
of executions via the g parameter the maximum run time
for each experiment was set to 12 hours. The following
summarises the results:
• SHRIKE succeeds in producing a PHP program
achieving the required layout in 21 of the 30 ex-
periments run and fails in 9 (a 70% success rate).
• There are 15 noise-free benchmarks of which
SHRIKE solves all 15, and 15 noisy benchmarks
of which SHRIKE solves 6. This follows what one
would expect from the synthetic benchmarks.
• In the successful cases the analysis took on average
571 seconds and 720,000 candidates.
Of the nine benchmarks which SHRIKE does not solve,
eight involve CVE-2016-7126. The most likely reason for
the difficulty of benchmarks involving this vulnerability
is noise in the interaction sequences involved. The source
buffer for this vulnerability results from an allocation re-
quest of size 1, which PHP rounds up to 8 – an allocation
size that is quite common throughout PHP, and prone to
occurring as noise. There is a noisy allocation in the inter-
action sequence which allocates the source buffer itself,
several of the interaction sequences which allocate the
target structures also have noisy allocations, and all inter-
action sequences which SHRIKE discovered for making
allocations of size 8 involve at least one noisy allocation.
For example, the shortest sequence discovered for making
an allocation of size 8 is a call to imagecreate(57, 1)
which triggers an allocation of size 7360, two allocations
of size 8 and two allocations of size 57. In contrast, there
is little or no noise involved in the benchmarks utilising
CVE-2016-5093 and CVE-2015-8865.
4.3 Generating a Control-Flow Hijacking
Exploit for PHP
To show that SHRIKE can be integrated into the develop-
ment of a full exploit we selected another vulnerability
in PHP. CVE-2013-2110 allows an attacker to write a
NULL byte immediately after the end of a heap-allocated
buffer. One must utilise that NULL byte write to corrupt
a location that will enable more useful exploitation prim-
itives. Our aim is to convert the NULL byte write into
both an information leak to defeat ASLR and the ability
to modify arbitrary memory locations.
We first searched SHRIKE’s database for interaction
sequences that allocate structures that have a pointer as
their first field. This lead us to the imagecreate function
which creates a gdImage structure. This structure uses
a pointer to an array of pointers to represent a grid of
pixels in an image. By corrupting this pointer via the
NULL byte write, and then allocating a buffer we control
at the location it points to post-corruption, an attacker can
control the locations that are read and written from when
pixels are read and written.
Listing 4 shows the template provided to SHRIKE. In
less than 10 seconds SHRIKE finds an input that places
the source immediately prior to the destination. Thus the
pointer that is the first field of the gdImage structure is
corrupted. Listing 5 in the appendices shows part of the
generated solution. After the corruption occurs the re-
quired memory read and write primitives can be achieved
by allocating a controllable buffer into the location where
the corrupted pointer now points. For brevity we leave out
the remaining details of the exploit, but it can be found
in full in the SHRIKE repository. The end result is a PHP
script that hijacks the control flow of the interpreter and
executes native code controlled by the attacker.
4.4 Research Questions
RQ1: What factors most significantly impact the dif-
ficulty of the heap layout manipulation problem in a
deterministic setting?
The following factors had the most significant impact
on problem difficulty:
• Noise. In the synthetic benchmarks, noise clearly
impacts difficulty. As more noise is added, more
holes typically have to be created. In the worst case
(dlmalloc) we see a drop off from a 99% overall
success rate to 33% when four noisy allocations are
included. A similar success rate is seen for avrlibc
and tcmalloc with four noisy allocations. In the
evaluation on PHP noise again played a significant
role, with SHRIKE solving 100% of noise-free in-
stances and 40% of noisy instances.
• Segregated storage. In the synthetic benchmarks
segregated storage leads to a decline in the overall
success rate on noise-free instances from 100-99%
to 72%.
• Allocation order to corruption direction relation-
ship. For all configurations of allocator, noise and
starting state, the problems involving the natural
order were easier. For the noise-free instances on
avrlibc and dlmalloc the difference is in terms
of solved problems is just 1-2%, but as noise is in-
troduced the success rate between the natural and
reversed benchmarks diverges. For dlmalloc with
four noisy allocations the success rate for the natural
order is 49% but only 17% for the reversed order, a
difference of 32%.
RQ2: Is pseudo-random search an effective ap-
proach to heap-layout manipulation?
Without segregated storage, when there is no noise
then 100-99% of problems were solved, with most exper-
iments taking 15 seconds or less. As noise is added the
rate of success drops to 51% and 46% for a single noisy
allocation, for dlmalloc and avrlibc respectively, and
then to 41% and 33% for four noisy allocations. The
extra constraints imposed on layout by segregated storage
present more of a challenge. On noise-free runs the rate
of success is 72% and drops to 52% and 37% as one and
four noisy allocations, respectively, are added. However,
as noted in section 4.1, if all 10 runs of each experiment
are considered together then 78% of the benchmarks are
solved at least once.
On the synthetic benchmarks it is clear that the effec-
tiveness of pseudo-random search varies depending on
whether segregated storage is in use, the amount of noise,
the allocation order to corruption direction relationship
and the available computational resources. In the best
case, pseudo-random search can solve benchmarks in sec-
onds, while in the more difficult ones it still attains a high
enough success rate to be worthwhile given its simplicity.
When embedded in SHRIKE, pseudo-random search
approach also proved effective, with similar caveats relat-
ing to noise. 100% of noise-free problems were solved,
while 40% of those involving noise were. On average the
search took less than 10 minutes and 750,000 candidates,
for instances on which it succeeded.
RQ3: Can heap layout manipulation be automated
effectively for real-world programs?
Our experiments with PHP indicate that automatic
HLM can be performed effectively for real world pro-
grams. As mentioned in RQ2, SHRIKE had a 70% success
rate overall, and a 100% success rate in cases where there
was no noise.
SHRIKE demonstrates that it is possible to automate
the process in an end-to-end manner, with automatic dis-
covery of a mapping from the target program’s API to
interaction sequences, discovery of interesting corruption
targets, and search for the required layout. Furthermore,
SHRIKE’s template based approach show that a system
with these capabilities can be naturally integrated into the
exploit development process.
4.5 Generalisability
Regarding generalisability, our experiments are not ex-
haustive and care must be taken in extrapolating to bench-
marks besides those presented. However, we believe
that the presented search algorithm and architecture for
SHRIKE are likely to work similarly well with other lan-
guage interpreters. SHRIKE depends firstly on some
means to discover language constructs and correlate them
with their resulting allocator interactions, and secondly
on a search algorithm that can piece together these frag-
ments to discover a required layout. The approach used
in SHRIKE to solve the first problem is based on previous
work on vulnerability detection that has been shown to
work on interpreters for Javascript and Ruby, as well as
PHP [17,18]. Our extensions, namely a different approach
to fuzzing as well as instrumentation to record allocator
interactions, do not threaten the underlying assumptions
of the prior work. Our solution to the second problem,
namely the random search algorithm, has demonstrated
its capabilities on a diverse set of benchmarks. Thus, we
believe it is reasonable to expect similar results versus
targets that rely on allocators with a similar architecture.
4.6 Threats to Validity
The results on our synthetic benchmarks are impacted by
our choice of source and destination sizes. There may
be combinations of these that produce layout problems
that are significantly more or less difficult to solve. A
different set of starting sequences, or available interaction
sequences may also impact the results. We have attempted
to mitigate these issues by selecting diverse sizes and
starting sequences, and allowing the analysis engine to
utilise only a minimal set of interaction sequences.
Our results on PHP are affected by our choice of vul-
nerabilities and target data structures, and we could have
inadvertently selected for cases that are outliers. We have
attempted to mitigate this possibility by utilising ten dif-
ferent target structures and vulnerabilities in three com-
pletely different sub-components of PHP. The restriction
of our evaluation to a language interpreter also poses a
threat if considering generalisability, as the available inter-
action sequences may differ in other classes of software.
We have attempted to mitigate this threat by limiting the
interaction sequences used to those that contain an alloca-
tion of a size equal to one of the allocation sizes found in
the sequences which allocate the source and destination.
5 Related Work
Dullien [11] formalises the concept of an exploit as
the process of setting up and programming a weird ma-
chine. In the context of this formalisation, heap layout
manipulation can be viewed as part of the process for
producing the correct sane state from which to transition
to a weird state.
The hacking and security communities have exten-
sively published on reverse engineering heap implemen-
tations [31, 35], leveraging weaknesses in those imple-
mentations for exploitation [21, 23, 25], and heap lay-
out manipulation for exploitation [19, 22]. There is also
work on constructing libraries for debugging heap inter-
nals [3] and libraries which wrap an application’s API
to provide layout manipulation primitives [28]. Manu-
ally constructed solutions for heap layout manipulation in
non-deterministic settings are also commonplace in the
literature of the hacking and security communities [7, 15].
Several papers [5,8,16] have focused on the AEG prob-
lem. These implementations are based on symbolic execu-
tion and exclusively focus on exploitation of stack-based
buffer overflows. More recently, as part of the DARPA
Cyber Grand Challenge [10] (CGC), a number automated
systems [13, 14, 29, 30] were developed which combine
symbolic execution and high performance fuzzing to iden-
tify, exploit and patch software vulnerabilities in an au-
tonomous fashion. As with earlier systems, none of the
CGC participants appear to specifically address the chal-
lenges of heap-based vulnerabilities.
In [26] the authors present work on exploit generation
for heap-based vulnerabilities that is orthogonal to ours.
Using a driver program the system builds a database of
conditions on the heap layout that, if met, would allow for
corruption of heap metadata to be turned into a write-N
primitive [22]. To leverage these primitives in an exploit
for a real program it is assumed that an input is provided
for the program that results in the required heap layout
prior to triggering the metadata corruption. In this paper
we have demonstrated an approach to producing inputs
that satisfy heap layout constraints, and thus could be
used to process vulnerability triggers into inputs that meet
the requirements of their system.
Vanegue [33] defines a calculus for a simple heap al-
locator and also provides a formal definition [32] of the
related problem of automatically producing inputs which
maximise the likelihood of reaching a particular program
state given a non-deterministic heap allocator.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have outlined the heap layout
manipulation problem as a distinct task within the context
of automated exploit generation. We have presented a
simple, but effective, algorithm for HLM in the case of
a deterministic allocator and a known starting state, and
shown that it can succeed in a significant number of syn-
thetic benchmarks. We have also described an end-to-end
system for HLM and shown that it is effective when used
with real vulnerabilities in the PHP interpreter.
Finally, we have demonstrated how a system for auto-
matic HLM can be integrated into exploit development.
The directives provided by SHRIKE allow the exploit de-
veloper to focus on the higher level concepts in the exploit,
while letting SHRIKE resolve heap layout constraints. To
the best of our knowledge, this is a novel approach to
adding automation to exploit generation, and shows how
an exploit developer’s domain knowledge and creativity
can be combined with automated reasoning engines to
produce exploits. Further research is necessary to expand
on the concept, but we believe such human-machine hy-
brid approaches are likely to be an effective means of
producing exploits for real systems.
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Appendix
Title
# Allocator
Interactions # Allocs # Frees
php-emalloc 571 366 205
php-malloc 15078 12714 2634
python-malloc 6160 3710 2450
ruby-malloc 70895 51827 19068
Table 2: Summary of the heap initialisation se-
quences for synthetic benchmarks. All sequences
were captured by hooking the malloc, free,
realloc and calloc functions of the system allo-
cator, except for php-emalloc which was captured
by hooking the allocation functions of the custom
allocator that comes with PHP.
Type Size
Allocation
Function
gdImage 7360 imagecreate
xmlwriter object 16 xmlwriter open memory
php hash data 32 hash init
int * 8 imagecreatetruecolor
Scanner 24 date create
timelib tzinfo 160 mktime
HashTable 264 timezone identifier list
php interval obj 64 unserialize
int * 40 imagecreatetruecolor
php stream 232 stream socket pair
Table 3: Target structures used in evaluating SHRIKE.
Each has a pointer as its first field.
1 <?php
2 $quote_str = str_repeat("\xf4", 123);
3
4 $var_vtx_0 = str_repeat("747 X ", 58);
5 $var_vtx_1 = str_repeat("747 X ", 58);
6 $var_vtx_2 = str_repeat("747 X ", 58);
7 $var_vtx_3 = imagecreatetruecolor(346, 48);
8 <...>
9 shrike_record_alloc(0, 1);
10 $image = imagecreate(1, 2);
11 <...>
12 $var_vtx_300 = str_repeat("747 X ", 58);
13 $var_vtx_3 = 0;
14 <...>
15 shrike_record_alloc(0, 2);
16 quoted_printable_encode($quote_str);
17 $distance = shrike_get_distance(1, 2);
18 if ($distance != 384) {
19 exit("Invalid layout.\n");
20 }
Listing 5: Part of the solution discovered for using CVE-
2013-2110 to corrupt the gdImage structure, which is
the 1st allocation made by imagecreate on line 11.
Multiple calls are made to functions that have been
discovered to trigger the desired allocator interactions.
Frees are triggered by destroying previously created
objects, as can be seen with var shrike 3 on line 14.
The overflow source is the 1st allocation performed by
quoted printable encode on line 17
Table 4: Synthetic benchmark results. For each experiment the search was run
for a maximum of 500,000 candidates. All experiments were run 9 times and
the results below are the average of those runs. ‘% Solved’ is the percentage of
the 72 experiments for each row in which an input was found placing the source
and destination adjacent to each other. ‘% Natural’ is the percentage of the 36
natural allocation order to corruption direction experiments which were solved. ‘%
Reversed’ is the percentage of the 36 reversed allocation order to corruption direction
experiments which were solved.
Allocator Start State Noise % Solved % Natural % Reversed
avrlibc-r2537 php-emalloc 0 100 100 100
avrlibc-r2537 php-malloc 0 100 100 100
avrlibc-r2537 python-malloc 0 100 100 100
avrlibc-r2537 ruby-malloc 0 99 100 98
dlmalloc-2.8.6 php-emalloc 0 99 100 99
dlmalloc-2.8.6 php-malloc 0 100 100 100
dlmalloc-2.8.6 python-malloc 0 99 100 97
dlmalloc-2.8.6 ruby-malloc 0 99 100 98
tcmalloc-2.6.1 php-emalloc 0 73 79 67
tcmalloc-2.6.1 php-malloc 0 77 80 75
tcmalloc-2.6.1 python-malloc 0 63 63 62
tcmalloc-2.6.1 ruby-malloc 0 75 78 71
avrlibc-r2537 php-emalloc 1 55 51 59
avrlibc-r2537 php-malloc 1 51 46 56
avrlibc-r2537 python-malloc 1 49 51 46
avrlibc-r2537 ruby-malloc 1 49 50 48
dlmalloc-2.8.6 php-emalloc 1 49 65 32
dlmalloc-2.8.6 php-malloc 1 49 62 37
dlmalloc-2.8.6 python-malloc 1 42 56 27
dlmalloc-2.8.6 ruby-malloc 1 43 58 27
tcmalloc-2.6.1 php-emalloc 1 52 59 45
tcmalloc-2.6.1 php-malloc 1 55 61 48
tcmalloc-2.6.1 python-malloc 1 50 52 48
tcmalloc-2.6.1 ruby-malloc 1 53 61 44
avrlibc-r2537 php-emalloc 4 43 44 42
avrlibc-r2537 php-malloc 4 40 41 40
avrlibc-r2537 python-malloc 4 42 47 37
avrlibc-r2537 ruby-malloc 4 39 45 33
dlmalloc-2.8.6 php-emalloc 4 34 51 16
dlmalloc-2.8.6 php-malloc 4 31 44 17
dlmalloc-2.8.6 python-malloc 4 33 50 16
dlmalloc-2.8.6 ruby-malloc 4 35 51 20
tcmalloc-2.6.1 php-emalloc 4 40 53 27
tcmalloc-2.6.1 php-malloc 4 39 53 25
tcmalloc-2.6.1 python-malloc 4 32 42 22
tcmalloc-2.6.1 ruby-malloc 4 38 54 22
Table 5: Results of heap layout manipulation for vulnerabilities in PHP. Experiments were run for a
maximum of 12 hours. All experiments were run 3 times and the results below are the average of these
runs. ‘Src. Size’ is the size in bytes of the source allocation. ‘Dst. Size’ is the size in bytes of the
destination allocation. ‘Src./Dst. Noise’ is the number of noisy allocations triggered by the allocation
of the source and destination. ‘Manip. Seq. Noise’ is the amount of noise in the sequences available
to SHRIKE for allocating and freeing buffers with size equal to the source and destination. ‘Initial
Dist.’ is the distance from the source to the destination if they are allocated without any attempt at heap
layout manipulation. ‘Final Dist.’ is the distance from the source to the destination in the best result
that SHRIKE could find. A distance of 0 means the problem was solved and the source and destination
were immediately adjacent. ‘Time to best‘ is the number of seconds required to find the best result.
‘Candidates to best‘ is the number of candidates required to find the best result.
CVE ID
Src.
Size
Dst.
Size
Src./Dst.
Noise
Manip. Seq.
Noise
Initial
Dist.
Final
Dist.
Time to
Best
Candidates to
Best
2015-8865 480 7360 0 0 -16384 0 <1 106
2015-8865 480 16 0 0 -491424 0 170 218809
2015-8865 480 32 0 0 -96832 0 217 286313
2015-8865 480 8 0 1 -540664 0 642 862689
2015-8865 480 24 0 0 -151456 0 16 13263
2015-8865 480 160 0 0 -57344 0 <1 63
2015-8865 480 264 0 0 -137344 0 <1 84
2015-8865 480 64 1 0 -499520 0 12 13967
2015-8865 480 40 0 0 -128832 0 25 15113
2015-8865 480 232 0 0 -101376 0 <1 69
2016-5093 544 7360 1 0 84736 0 < 1 640
2016-5093 544 16 0 0 -402592 0 4202 5295968
2016-5093 544 32 0 0 -7776 0 2392 3014661
2016-5093 544 8 0 1 -406776 8 6905 9049924
2016-5093 544 24 0 0 -62624 0 202 231884
2016-5093 544 160 0 0 80640 0 < 1 104
2016-5093 544 264 0 0 -27712 0 < 1 76
2016-5093 544 64 1 0 -410624 0 487 607824
2016-5093 544 40 0 0 -31648 0 15 458
2016-5093 544 232 0 0 77312 0 3 116
2016-7126 1 7360 4 2 495576 0 958 1181098
2016-7126 1 16 0 4 4360 88 4816 6260800
2016-7126 1 32 1 1 398808 64 5594 7272200
2016-7126 1 8 3 2 -32 0 2662 3356935
2016-7126 1 24 3 1 344152 56 4199 5458700
2016-7126 1 160 14 1 483288 24 3005 3864430
2016-7126 1 264 0 1 379064 24 5917 7615179
2016-7126 1 64 1 3 -3912 72 2752 3539072
2016-7126 1 40 5 1 375248 144 7980 10134600
2016-7126 1 232 0 1 439288 40 5673 7908162
